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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN M. STONE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
li,

I,:

vs.
GORDON

Case No. 17613
BARTH STONE,
Defendant-Appellant.

l, l:

I,::

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARILYN M. STONE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
,:

Appellant GORDON STONE's Order to Show Cause requesting
a reduction in alimony was dismissed for failure to show a signif icant change in circumstances, and GORDON STONE appealed.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, in the Third Judicial
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, heard Appellant GORDON STONE's
request to reduce alimony on January 6, 1981.

In November, 1980,

Appellant GORDON STONE moved the court for and was granted an
Order to Show Cause why the alimony provision of the January 6,
1976, Divorce Decree should not be modified to reduce alimony to
$100.00 per month.

Judge Conder considered the file, memoranda

of counsel and the deposition of Appellant GORDON STONE in dismissjng the Order on January 19, 1981, on the basis that adjustments
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in income, up or do wn , are insu
·
f ficient grounds to su

pport an

alimony modification.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant GORDON STONE seeks reversal of the trial
court ruling dismissing his Order to Show Cause and an Order

o:

this Court modifying the Divorce Decree to reduce substantial!"
l

the amount of monthly alimony due Respondent MARILYN STONE.
Respondent MARILYN STONE respectfully requests this
Court to affirm the Judgment of the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rule 75 (p) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requ::
that the appellant's brief contain "a concise statement of the
material facts of the case citing the pages of the Record
supporting such statement."

However, Appellant GORDON STONE do<

not once cite the Record in his Statement of Facts.

The State:i

of Facts in Appellant GORDON STONE' s Brief is controverted by
Respondent MARILYN STONE with references to the pages of the
Transcript on Appeal and the Exhibits.
Respondent MARILYN M. STONE and Appellant GORDON BAR~
six children duri:
STONE were married in February, 1953, and had
Decree dated
their marriage (R. 12-13) which ended by Divorce
January 6, 1976

(R. 15-18).

At all times during the divorce,

Respondent was represented by Jon C. Heaton and J.
(R. 4, 12 & 15) of the law firm of Prince, Yeates,
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Rand Hirschi
ward

&

Getc1r

and Appellant by Byron L. Stubbs (R. 8, 115, 160-161).
~ntry

Prior to

of ':he Divorce Decree, the parties, with a iv ice of t~-.eir

counsel (R. 115, 160-161) executed a stipulated property distribution agreement (R. 5-10) which was incorporated into the
Divorce Decree by the trial court (R. 15-18).
of

lly

Appellant has testified that he fully understood the
agreement and consulted his attorney regarding the property
distribution agreement prior to its execution (R. 160-161).
Following the granting of the Divorce Decree, Appellant
remarried and currently lives with his second wife and her two
daughters by a former marriage (R. 166).

Appellant's current

wife works full-time (R. 161-162) and receives monthly child
equ1:

he

: doc

urir

d

,

support payments for her minor daughter (R. 180) .
Respondent is currently employed full-time as manager
of the Boyles Brothers Employees Credit Union and has been so
employed since the date of the Divorce Decree (R. 71).

She

currently has living at home one minor child and another child
who recently returned from a full-time religious mission for the
L.D.S. Church (R. 71).
Based upon Appellant's tax returns, Exhibits 6-10
herein, and pursuant to the terms of the Divorce Decree (R. 16-17),
the currently monthly alimony due Respondent is at least $473.33.
As a convenience to this Court, a summary of the calculations
used in deriving this figure is attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.
Further, monthly child support currently due under the Divorce
Decree is $140. 00 (R. 16-17).
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By letter of November 14, 1980

and without
.
'
notice to
opposing counsel, Appellant's counsel made d
·
emand upon ReJponde:·
for reduction in alimony (R. 61-62), based upon the following
reasons:
1.

Appellant realizes little net gain from salary

increases after deduction of taxes and alimony increases (R.

611

2.

Respondent's gross salary has increased (R. 61);

3.

Only one child remains living at home (R. 62);

4.

Respondent has failed to "adjust [her] life and

improve [her] position" (R. 62); and
5.

Appellant's financial support of a son serving a

full-time religious mission for the L.D.S. Church (R. 62).
Appellant then moved the trial court for an Order to
Show Cause why alimony should not be reduced to $100 per month,
listing on the mailing certificate Denis R. Morrill, a partner t

1

the firm of Prince, Yeates
as counsel (R. 20).

&

Geldzahler, and brother of Responde:

Appellant's Motion was granted by Order of

November 25, 1980 (R. 45).
posed December 23, 1980

Pursuant to notice, Appellant wasd1·

(R. 142-204) and Interrogatories were

propounded by Respondent December 2, 1980 (R. 25-44).
In his deposition, Appellant GORDON STONE set forth
the basis for his request for reduction in alimony as follows:
Question:

Answer:

What prompted you to make the request.
for the change in the agreement at this
time?
l'
that I aJ1I
Living expenses and the fee ing I ork for
not getting anything out of what w
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Question:

Is there anything else that prompted you
to make this request for the change in
the agreement at this time?

Answer:

No.

(R. 201-202)

Appellant GORDON STONE further testified as follows respecting
the changed circumstances experienced by Respondent MARILYN STONE:
Question:

Do you contend that your ex-wife, Marilyn
Stone, has experienced changed circumstances
which would justify the modification of the
agreement?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

What are those?

Answer:

Increases in her earnings.

Question:

Do you know what those are?

Answer:

No.

(R. 170)

* * * * * * *
Question:

Do you know whether or not she has attained
a position [at her place of employment] of
greater responsibility since 1976?

Answer:

No, she's been the manager there since then.

Question:

And you have no idea what her income may
or may not have been?

Answer:

No.

Question:

At the time you entered into the agreement
in 1976, you considered, didn't you, her
income from Boyles Brothers?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

Do you contend there h~s bee~ any othe;
changed circumstances ~n M~rilyn Ston7 ~
situation which would JUstify the modification of the agreement?

Answer:

Yes.

le:

11·
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Question:

What is that other circumstance?

Answer:

Less children at home.

(R. 171)

* * * * * * *
Question:

Is it your contention that you're seekin
to have the court i;iodify both the child g
support and the alimony obligations?

Answer:

No.

Question:

What is your position?

Answer:

Just the alimony.

Question:

Just the alimony?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

De:' you contend there are any other changec
circumstances of Marilyn Stone which you
believe would cause the court to modify tl;
agreement?

Answer:

Not that I am aware of.

Question:

Just so we are clear, you contend there
are two changed circumstances of Marilyn
Stone's situation which would justify the
modification.
One is the increase in her
income, is that correct?

Answer:

Uh-huh (Affirmative).

Question:

And the second is that there are fewer
children in the home?
(R. 172)

Answer:

(The witness is nodding affirmatively.)
173 )

( R.

Appellant GORDON STONE also testified in his deposition thatn'
has no knowledge of Respondent MARILYN STONE' s increased livir.;
expenses (R. 173), medical expenses
expenses

(R. 174) or extraordinary

(R. 174).
In his deposition, Appellant GORDON STONE testified

·
two yea:
that his employer furnishes him a new automobile every
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and pays all maintenance, gasoline and related expenses (R. 152 _
154).

This automobile is used by Appellant for non-business,

~ersonal activities without compensation to the company (R. 154-

155).

Appellant GORDON STONE also testified that he owns two

homes (R. 175, 182-183).
On January 6, 1981, a hearing on the Order to Show
cause was held before the Honorable Dean E. Conder (R. 68).
Both Appellant and Respondent were personally present with their
respective counsel (R. 68).

At the hearing, the court repeatedly

attempted to elicit from Appellant's counsel the evidence upon
which the request to reduce alimony was based.

Appellant's counsel

stipulated to the court that the only evidence to be offered was
contained in Exhibits 1-10 admitted by the court (R. 122).
Although present, Appellant did not testify.
Following the hearing, Respondent filed with the court
a Supplemental Memorandum in response to assertions made by
Appellant's counsel at oral argument (R. 73-75).

Also following

the hearing, on January 14, 1981, Appellant served upon Respondent's
counsel Appellant's Answers to Interrogatories (R. 76-105),
Appellant's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Reduction of
Alimony (R. 106-111) and an affidavit of Appellant (R. 112-116).
In his affidavit (R. 112-115), filed one week after
the hearing at which he failed to testify, Appellant GORDON STONE
made several self-serving statements respecting his income for
the years 1975-1979 and respecting his claimed failure to follow
his attorney's advice in executing the property settlement agreement.
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Appellant's claim that Respondent MARILYN STONE's b

ro

th

partner in the law firm representing her throughout th
had somehow coerced Appellant into ignoring his own

er, a

is matter,

attorney's

counsel, was not brought out in Appellant's deposition nor at
the January 6, 1981, hearing.

In his deposition, Appellant

specifically testified that he consulted with his current counst.
prior to executing the agreement (R. 160-161).
Judge Conder, by minute entry of January 19, 1981,
dismissed Appellant's Order to Show Cause on grounds that there
was not sufficient evidence to support a change in alimony (R.:.
In so ruling, Judge Conder relied upon Carter v. Carter, 563 P.i
177 (Utah 1977), in stating that "[a]djustrnents in income (upo:
down)

are not sufficient to base an adjustment in alimony."

(R.117)

In finding the evidence insufficient to support the

requested change, Judge Conder relied upon the file, mernorandac
counsel and the deposition of Appellant (R. 117), and signedt\:
Order dismissing Appellant's Order to Show Cause on February

JO,

1981 (R. 132). Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on March 11
1981 (R. 134).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT APPELLANT
GORDON STONE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT
MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS.
.
The only question presented on appeal is whether
Appellant GORDON STONE demonstrated substantial change in mater:
circumstances of the parties sufficient to

support a reductiU:
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a

of alimony payments from approximately $473.33 per month to
$100.00 per month.

After hearing the evidence and considering

arguments and memoranda of counsel, Judge Conder ruled that
Appellant had failed to do so.
On appeal, Appellant GORDON STONE asserts as bases
for his attempts to reduce alimony, the following claimed changes
in circumstances (Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p.2):
1.

Increase in Respondent Marilyn Stone's salary.

2.

Reduction in the number of minor children living
at home.

3.

Increase in value of real property owned by
Respondent.

4.

Obviation of Respondent's need for a large
family home.

5.

Appellant's remarriage.

6.

Automatic increase in alimony as discouraging
either party from improving their financial
conditions.

As Judge Conder ruled in the trial court, mere changes
in income, up or down, are insufficient to support a modification
of a Divorce Decree. Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977).
Appellant's reliance on the number of children in the
home as a reason for reducing alimony is misplaced since the purpose
of alimony is to "provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage,
and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge."
v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981).

Georgedes

In this instance,

where alimony and child support payments were bargained for by the
parties, represented by counsel, as part of a stipulated property
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

distribution agreement incorporated in th

e

D.
i vorce Decree, the

sepa :ability of these support payments must be maintained. In
this case, child support payments have been re d uced over time
as the children have attained majority.
Appellant can cite to nothing in the Record in suppor:
of his assertions respecting the i·ncreased v a 1 ue o f Respondent':
real property, Respondent's need for such a large family home,!:
the counter-productive effect of the alimony escalation clause
of the Divorce Decree.
Appellant's remarriage is a voluntary disability whk
does not relieve him of his obligations to his former family.
Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1978).
A.

On Appeal, This Court Will Afford Considerable
Deference to the Decision of the Trier of Fact.

The modification ofa Divorce Decree is a matter of
equity within the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court,
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981); Despain v.
Despain, 610 P. 2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1980); Land v. Land, 605 PJ'
1248, 1250

(Utah 1980); Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotaud llli

as amended; and, therefore, on appeal, this Court may review
.
questions o f 1 aw an d ques t ions
o f f ac t .
628 P.2d 1297, 1299

Chri"stensen v. Chr~
-

(Utah 1981); Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d

(Utah 1981); Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 9.

49111

In~

t forth the st~'
sen v. Christensen, supra at 1299, this court Se
yment
for review of decisions denying modifications of support pa
.
d
· derable
[O l n review, this Court will accor . cons1 urt due
deference to the judgment of the trial co
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In the instant case, Judge Conder issued his ruling
dismissing Appellant GORDON STONE's Order to Show Cause after
hearing oral argument and considering the file, memoranda of
counsel and the deposition of Appellant (R. 117).

On appeal,

Appellant asserts that the trial court accepted Appellant's
figures respecting percentage increases in income experienced by
the parties and that such figures were entered into evidence
unopposed

by Respondent MARILYN STONE.

Appellant further asserts

that "the balance of the evidence offered by the appellant-husband
indicated that the respondent's needs and requirements had substantially decreased since the date of the original Divorce
Decree."

(Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p. 4).
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, Appellant

GORDON STONE testified in his deposition that he had no personal
knowledge of Respondent's needs and requirements.

Appellant's

inference that Judge Conder failed to consider all the evidence is
rl

simply not supported by the Record.

;;,

Even if Judge Conder had accepted the percentage increase
E

figures presented in Appellant's post-hearing memorandum, which

:
1

he did not (R. 117), no other evidence was offered by Appellant
upon which the court could rely in making a determination respecting
substantial change in material circumstances.

Exhibits 1 through

10, the tax returns for 1975 through 1979 of Respondent and
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Appellant, were the only evidence offered at the hearing by
Appellant.

Although pi:esent at the January 6, 1981, hearing,

Appellant GORDON STONE did not testify.

Rather, he submittedm

the court, some two weeks after the hearing, a personal affidavit
containing numerous, self-serving statements designed to establi:'
without threat of cross-examination, what he perceives to be
significant changes in material circumstances.

None of the

assertions contained in the affidavit were raised in Appellant's
deposition or at the hearing before Judge Conder.
Judge Conder issued his ruling dismissing Appellant
GORDON STONE's Order to Show Cause after the memorandum and
affidavit of Appellant had been submitted.

Appellant can point

to nothing in the Record in support of his position that the
trial court failed to consider the "balance of the evidence"
which he alleges demonstrates that Respondent MARILYN STONE's
needs and requirements have substantially decreased.

Since Judge

Conder' s decision is based upon all information before him at
that time, and since Appellant has made no showing that (1)

~e

evidence clearly preponderates contrary to Judge Conder's
decision,

(2) Judge Conder abused his discretion, or (3) Judge

Conder misapplied principles of law, this Court should uphold the
decision of the trial court.

B.

Alimony Payments Will Be Modified Only Upon
A Showing of Substantial Change in Material
Circumstances.

While it is clear that the trial court has continuing
jurisdiction to modify Divorce Decrees as demanded by equity,
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fE_ulger v. Foulger, supra; Despain v. Despain, supra; Land v.
~, supra;

Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended,

it is well settled that the moving party must show a substantial

change of material circumstances to support such modification.
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978);
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 180, 181, 20 Utah 2d 360 (1968).

It is also well recognized by this Court that the party seeking the
modification bears the burden of persuasion.

Christensen v.

Christensen, supra at 1299; Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, supra;
Sorenson v. Sorenson, supra.
In Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981),
this Court stated:
The change in circumstance required to justify a
modification of the Decree of Divorce varies
with the type of modification contemplated.
Provisions in the original Decree of Divorce
granting alimony, child support, and the like,
must be readily susceptible to alteration at
a later date, as the needs which such provisions
were designed to fill are subject to rapid and
unpredictable change. Where a disposition of
real property is in question, however, courts
should properly be more reluctant to grant a
modification.
In the interest of securing
stability in titles, modifications in a Decree
of Divorce making disposition of real property
are to be granted only upon a showing of
compelling reasons arising from a substantial
and material change in circumstances.
The above holds true a fortiori where the property
disposition is the product of an agreement in
stipulation between the parties and sanctioned by
the trial court.
such a provision is the product
of an agreement bargained for by the partie~. As
such, a trial court should subsequently modify such
a provision only with great reluctance and based
upon compelling reasons.
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Although this Court has held that the standard of "great reluct;:
and compelling reasons" applies to dispositions of .:eal property
made pursuant to property settlement agreements between the
parties, Foulger v. Foulger, supra; Despain v. Despain, 610 P.li
1303, 1306 (Utah 1980); Land v. Land, supra at 1251, the Courth
also shown greater deference to alimony and child support paymen:
as integrated in property distribution agreements.

Christensen·.

Christensen, 628 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1981); Despain v. Despain, 621
P.2d 526

(Utah 1981).
In Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1981),

this Court denied a defendant-husband's request for reduction
of child support payments and stated:
Defendant has not urged any compelling reasons
for invoking the powers of equity to abrogate
the property settlement; nor has he shown a
change of circumstances to justify modification
of the child support payments. Over a period of
three years, the parties were involved in
attaining an agreement.
Both made concessions
in exchange for benefits.

* * * * *
It is a proper assumption that plaintiff settled
for the sum she received in reliance on the
availability of additional funds to assist the
children, living with her, in completing their
education.
It would be highly unequitable under
the circumstances of this case to permit defendant
to retain the benefits and be relieved of the
obligations he assumed in his bargain with plaintiff·
In the instant case, the sole change in circumstance
addressed by Appellant GORDON STONE at the January 6, 1981,
hearing was the increase in income experienced by both parties.
(Exhibits 1 through 10.)

The only other source of evidence to
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which Appellant GORDON STONE can point in support of his allegations
c·f ch<nged circumstance are his affidavits and deE-osition.

As set

forth above, Appellant testified in his deposition (R. 201) that
the changed circumstances upon which he relied in seeking modification of the alimony provision consisted of "living expenses and
the feeling that [he is) not getting anything out of what [he)
works for."

(R. 201)

He further testified that the only changes

respecting the needs and circumstances of Respondent MARILYN STONE
of which he was aware were an increase in her income and the fact
that fewer children were living at home.

(R. 172-173).

Appellant

also testified that he had no knowledge respecting changes in
Respondent's cost-of-living expenses (R. 173), her medical expenses
(R. 174), or other extraordinary expenses she may have encountered
(R. 174) .
The only changes in circumstances on the record are the
increases in the respective salaries of Respondent and Appellant.
It is clear from the lack of evidence on the Record that Appellant

has failed to meet his burden of showing of a significant change
in material circumstances, and the Order to Show Cause was properly
dismissed.
C.

An Increase in a Former Wife's Income, Standing
Alone, is Insufficient to Support a Modification
of the Divorce Decree Reducing Alimony Payments.

It is clear that the amount of alimony payable is not
controlled solely by the income level of the husband.

Carter v.

Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis,
580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978).

A change in income, however, is
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an important factor for the court to consider in evaluating
appropriate and equitable modification in alimony payments.
Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981) ·,

c arter v,

Carter, supra; Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944, 1 Utah2d:
(1953).
Other major factors to be considered by the court in
considering alimony modifications are the needs and requirement
the former wife and inflation, Carter v. Carter, supra; Wright
Wright, 586 P. 2d 443, 445

(Utah 1978). The purpose for alimony

is to "provide support for the wife as nearly as possible

~

the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge."

Georgedes v.

Georgedes, supra.
In his Brief, Appellant GORDON STONE attempts to
distinguish Carter by assertion that the trial court had indepe~
knowledge going to the credibility of the husband.

Even if~

could be distinguished on grounds of credibility, the rationale
set forth in unaffected.

Alimony payable is not dependent sote:

upon changes, up or down, in income.
D.

The Record Contains No Other Evidence to Support
Appellant's Contention of Significant Change
In Circumstances.

Appellant GORDON STONE in his Brief asserts that only
one minor child is currently living with Respondent MARILYN

STO~c

Since the filing of this Appeal, another son has returned from
D. s. Church and
serving a full-time religious mission for the L.
current:y resides with Respondent.
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In support of his contention that the number of
children livin<:J at home has something to do with Respondent's
need for a large home, and that the value of the home is related
to alimony payable, Appellant relies upon Sorenson v. Sorenson,
438 P.2d 180, 20 Utah 2d 360 (1968).

In Sorenson, this Court

overturned the trial court's reduction in alimony on grounds that
the defendant-husband had failed to show adequate basis for modifica ti on.

There, as here, the court noted that there was no

evidence given or offered to show the amounts or values of property
or income therefrom.

Appellant's reliance on Sorenson is misplaced

because the record before this Court does not contain anything
to support the contentions relating to need for the home or change
in value thereof.
Appellant also cites, in his Index to Cases, Ridge v.
Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (Utah 1975).
of Appellant's

Ridge is not cited in the body

Brief, but even it it were, the case is inapplicable

since the reduction in alimony granted therein is based on a
28 percent decrease in the husband's salary.

In the instant case,

Appellant's salary has increased substantially during the period
since the Divorce Decree was granted.

(Exhibits Nos. 6-10)

The Record before this Court clearly does not support
Appellant's contentions respecting changed needs and requirements
of Respondent.
E.

Appellant's Remarriage Does Not Toll His.
Obligation to Make Support Payments to His
Former Wife and Children.

Appell~nt GORDON STONE asserts,

in his Brief (Brief of
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Defendant-Appellant, p. 7) that his remarriage and voluntary
support of his two step-children should somehow obviate his di:·
to pay alimony and child support to Respondent.

The voluntar;

remarriage of the defendant-husband and assumption by him of
support of his new wife and her children does not justify a
reduction in alimony.

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 4 38 P. 2d 180, Hl

20 Utah 2d 360 (1968); See also Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d

rn,,

(Utah 1978).
F.

The Alimony Increase Provision of the Divorce
Decree is Valid According to Public Policy and:
Enforceable.

Paragraph 9 of the Divorce Decree provides, in part:
[P]laintiff is awarded the sum of $200.00
per month as alimony.
This amount will continue
as the alimony obligation until such time as
defendant receives an additional salary increase.
At the time of this additional increase, and at
the time of any and all additional salary increases,
defendant's alimony obligation shall increase by
a sum equal to 35 percent of defendant's gross
salary increase.
(R. 17)
In Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981), this
Court overturned a lower court's alimony reduction and upheld
a provision of a Divorce Decree granting the former wife chi!C
support of $12,000 plus one-half of the former husband's after·
tax income in excess of $24 ,000.

In Christensen, the husband'!

income had increased since the Decree, and he was reluctant to
share the increase with his former family.

This Court rejecte:

his arguments respecting a decrease in profit margin and

~e

failure of his former wife to become employed within a reasonat:
time.
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In the instant case, Appellant's contention that he is
"not getting anything out of what [he] works for"
same argument rejected in Christensen.

(R. 201) is the

Appellant in the case at

bar was represented at the time of execution of the settlement
agreement by the same attorney currently representing him.
Appellant has admitted he consulted with counsel before signing
the document (R.

160-161).

This Court should not now reinstate

rights and privileges Appellant has voluntarily contracted away
simply because Appellant has come to regret the bargain made.
Land v. Land, 604 P.2d 1248, 1251.

(Utah 1980).

CONCLUSION
Appellant GORDON STONE must meet the burden of showing a
significant change in material circumstances to prevail on his
request to decrease alimony.

In light of the deference given trial

court decisions on appeal, and in light of the dearth of evidence
in the Record, this court should hold that Appellant has failed to
meet his burden.

Further, this Court should uphold the alimony

increase provision of the Divorce Decree because Appellant knowingly
entered the agreement with advice of counsel.

To strike down the

provision now that Appellant has come to regret his bargain would
be unequi table to Respondent in high degree.

This court should uphold the decision of the trial court.
Respectfully Submitted,
Gordon Strachan, Esq.
Steohen C. Rich, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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I hereby
cert:i.fy that on the
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fl1

day of August,

1981, I served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent
Marilyn M. Stone upon Byron L. Stubbs, Esq., attorney for
defendant-appellant, by depositing said copies in the U.S.
Mail, first-class postage prepaid thereon, addressed as
follows:
City, Utah

Byron L. Stubbs, Esq., 530 East 500 South, Salt Lake
84102.
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EXHIBIT "A"

Increase

~

Salary

19 75

$15,200

19 76

18,559

$3,359

19 77

19,858

19 78
19 79

..

35% of
Increase

Total
Yearlx Alimony

Monthly
Paxments

$2,400

$ 200.00

$1,176

3,576

298.00

1,299

455

4,031

336.00

22,246

2,388

836

4,867

406.00

24,568

2,322

813

5,680

473.33
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